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GRAPPLING WITH A GROTIAN MOMENT:
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE QUEST FOR A
NORMATIVE WORLD ORDER
Samuel K. Murumba *
I. INTRODUCTION
On the first day of the same French Revolution that
Wordsworth captured in his exuberant lines,
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven!
legend has it that one Frenchman's diary entry read: "Nothing
happened here today." The same mixture of enthusiasm and
skepticism greeted President Bush's 1991 announcement of a
new world order. But two years later no one needed to take his
word for it. By 1993 it had become clear that the world had
changed more rapidly and more fundamentally in two years
than in the previous forty. Who could have anticipated, five
years ago, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of the cold
war, the multilateral involvement of the United Nations in a
myriad of crises around the globe-the Persian Gulf, Somalia,
Cambodia, Angola, Libya, Haiti, El Salvador, South Africa,
Yugoslavia-while others, such as Nigeria, clamor for its atten-
tion? Who could foretell Nelson Mandela's release, the South
African regime's renunciation of apartheid as a tragic perver-
sion, a South African president addressing the UN General
Assembly for the first time since the 1945 San Francisco con-
ference, or Nelson Mandela's call for the end of sanctions
against South Africa? Who could have envisaged Yitzhak
Rabin and Yassir Arafat signing accords in Washington repeat-
ing the words of John Lennon's song, "Give peace a chance"?
So much has happened so fast that neither policy analysts nor
even intelligence agencies have had a chance to find their
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footing in this rapid transformation of orthodoxies into obsoles-
cence. The danger, however, is that incredulity can give way to
blind faith-that the hard work of transforming transitory
opportunities into lasting benefits can be abandoned for belief
in miracles. The current crisis in the former Soviet Union, the
intransigent clan warfare in Somalia, and the tribal bloodlet-
ting in Europe and South Africa caution us against this temp-
tation and alert us to the hard work which still needs to be
done.
Much has been written about recent changes, most of it ex
post facto.' Perhaps history is a more congenial vocation than
prophecy. Some writers, however, do predict or postulate mod-
els for the future.2 But all these analysts, retrospective or pro-
spective, have tended to concentrate on only two aspects of the
new world order: the political and the institutional. Political
analysts discuss power realignments and reconfigurations and
ask such questions as: who will be our friends now, and who
will be our enemies?3 Institutional analysts deal with the legal
1. See, e.g., FRANcIs FUKuYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1992); JOHN LUKAcs, THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE END OF THE
MODERN AGE (1993).
2. There is a mystical aura at the end of a millennium which makes the
urge to prophesy utterly irresistible despite the startling unpredictability of recent
events. Some books have taken on the dual role of analysis and prophesy with
vigor. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1993);
ALviN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH AND VIOLENCE AT THE EDGE
OF THE 21ST CENTURY (1990).
3. There are two principal camps here. There are those who see the post-cold
war world as unipolar-as one where the United States is the supreme power.
Krauthammer, for instance, writes: "The immediate post-cold war world is not
multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of the world power is the unchallenged su-
perpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies." Charles
Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FORiIGN AFF. 69 (1991).
On the other hand, there are those who vehemently reject this unipolar
view. Owen Harries goes further and denies that "the West" represents a coherent
unity without the Soviet threat. Owen Harries, 'The West" is Only a Flag of Con-
venience, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at 19. One also notes a certain helplessness
in the uncertain present, even a longing for more predictable days of identifiable
enemies:
One of the nice things about the Cold War was that we could nearly
always tell who were our friends and who were our enemies. There were
certain countries we could more or less count on to take our side, and
others that regularly opposed us. It is, however, more complicated now. If
we could previously take the opposition of countries in the communist
bloc for granted, we are now able to look to those same countries for
occasional support. With such nations potentially willing to side with us
on selected issues, we have fewer "reliable" enemies.
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structure of the UN, including such puzzles as the composition
and respective authority of the Security Council, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and the General Assembly.4
This Article focuses on the rather neglected third dimen-
sion of the world order: the normative one. In particular, it dis-
cusses how the perennial conflict between state sovereignty
and real human interests should be resolved for the new order.
The principal thesis which runs through the Article is that the
time has come to make the concept of human rights the irre-
ducible foundation of the world legal system. This will not
entail a withering away of the state-that is neither likely nor
desirable. But it will mean a reconceptualization of statehood
away from intrinsic sovereignty toward a more functional,
juristic personality.
There are three main parts to this Article. Part II revisits
the concept of state sovereignty-its Westphalian origin as a
normative concept, anthropocentric inroads in 1945, and the
competition between Grotian and Clausewitzian visions in the
period between 1945 and 1989. Part III deals with the
postmodernist challenge to the Grotian project, the latter hav-
ing for the time being triumphed over Clausewitzian realism
since the end of the cold war. Part IV then briefly sketches the
contours of a new statehood predicated upon intrinsic human
Lea Brilmayer, The Odd Advantage of Reliable Enemies, 32 HARV. INVL L.J. 331,
331 (1991).
This uncertainty of international political alignments at the century's end is
thought to be even more ominous for the South: will it mean jeopardy for the
right to development and, indeed, for all third generation and even second genera-
tion human rights? Could all rights be homogenized into civil and political rights?
See Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution or Retrenchment? International Human
Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 339, 345 (1991).
With regard to economic, social, and cultural rights, or the right to devel-
opment, the pessimistic view is an extrapolation from the West's advocacy of civil
and political rights throughout the post-1945 period. But this position needs to be
seen against the background and distortions of the cold war paradigm. Western-led
efforts in Somalia and Haiti seem to suggest that the West may look at these
matters differently. Some commentators are more positive about recent events. See,
e.g., Richard B. Bilder, International Law in the "New World Order": Some Prelim-
inary Reflections, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1992); Louis B. Sohn, How New
is the New International Legal Order?, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 205 (1992).
4. See Gerald P. McGinley, The I.C.J.'s Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 577, 587-600 (1992); Geoffrey R. Watson, Consti-
tutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993);
W. Michael Reisman, Note, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87.
AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
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dignity and human* rights consistent with the ultimate sover-
eignty of real human beings within each state.
II. OLD ORDER PARADIGMS AND STATEHOOD PRE-1989
A The Grotian Revolution and Statehood Before World War II
A "Grotian moment"5 is an epoch in which a confluence of
circumstances portends the birth of a new era in international
law so long as a Grotius is on hand to wrest the new order
from the chaos and ambiguities of the dying one. The first
Grotian moment is naturally that which Hugo Grotius himself
seized over four centuries ago and crafted into modern interna-
tional law. But to understand the nature of Grotius's work and
the normative imperatives of Grotian moments, one needs to
look briefly at the forerunner of international legal order-
ing-the Roman Empire.
The Pax Romana had a normative foundation: it rested on
the normative bedrock of natural law and on a legal system
synthesized from its diverse culture. With the spread of Roman
dominion, Greek natural law6 was handed down to the Ro-
5. The term is actually Richard Falk's. Richard Falk, Some Thoughts on the
Decline of International Law and Future Prospects, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 407-09
(1981) [hereinafter Falk, Some Thoughts]; Richard Falk, On the Recent Further
Decline of International Law, in LEGAL CHANGE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JULIUS
STONE 264, 272 (A.R. Blackshield ed., 1983).
6. The story of "natural rights" is in part also the story of natural law-that
law which stood above and censured human laws and conventions. Natural law
was the matrix in which many modern human-rights principles were molded, in-
cluding those in the American and French Declarations, and to a lesser degree
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself. Natural law was also
the vehicle through which Greek and other ancient notions of justice reached the
West and the world. JULIUS STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 18 (1968).
The story of natural law begins in ancient Greece with the Sophists philos-
ophizing about the nature of things. The Sophists argued that "the edicts of the
laws are imposed artificially, but those of nature are compulsory" and that "the
edicts of the laws are arrived at by consent, not by natural growth, whereas those
of nature are not a matter of consent." Id. at 16 (Antiphon, the Sophist, 5th B.C.).
Their version of natural law was man-centered and individualistic. Id. For Plato
natural law was the "unchanging idea of law" in a realm which only philosophers
could grasp, hence his belief that only philosophers should make laws. Aristotle,
on the other hand, regarded the nature of a thing as its state of highest develop-
ment-this was true of everything: "a man, a horse, or a family." 2 Aristotle,
Politics 28, in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 445, 446 (Mortimer J.
Adler ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1991). Natural law, he said, was immutable
and valid everywhere "as fire burns both here and in Persia," while the rules of
human or conventional justice were like "wine and corn measures . . .not every-
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mans amongst whom it found a keen recipient in Cicero.7 This
natural law had three dimensions: the lex aeterna (the law of
reason of the Cosmos), the jus humanum (human law) and the
jus naturale (natural law). Meanwhile, commercial practice
and diverse cultures were clamoring for recognition in Roman
jurisprudence. The jus civile (civil law) was inadequate to ac-
commodate them, and was in any case restricted to Roman
citizens. As the special Praetor-the Praetor Pere-
grinus-administered justice in disputes involving noncitizens,
however, he soon discovered that there were elements common
to the systems of the different foreign peoples of the empire.
Soon these elements formed a body of law, thejus gentium (the
law of nations or of humankind), which later merged with the
natural law to be administered as Roman law. In this process
natural law thus played the innovative role of adapting "the
law of a petty tribal agricultural society to the needs of an
empire diverse in constituent peoples and great in dominions,
wealth and commerce."
8
Natural law already involved a search for universal princi-
ples-principles based on human nature which might underlie
the various customary systems and serve as criteria for their
assessment. It is this element which Roman lawyers adminis-
tering justice among the diverse peoples of the empire seized
upon9 and developed into the law of nations or of human-
where equal." Nichomachean Ethics v. 7 (1134b-1135a) in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 339, 382 (Mortimer J. Adler ed. & W.D. Ross trans., 1991).
The Greeks philosophized about justice, natural law, and the art of govern-
ment, but they did not build a durable legal system. Philosophy was their princi-
pal pre-occupation-law only a subordinate concern. They formed no legal repre-
sentation to allow skill and expertise in the art of advocacy to grow beyond the
most basic level. Consequently, for the Greeks, even "natural law remained essen-
tially a philosopher's speculation in an age of unsettled convictions and political
disorders . . . ." STONE, supra, at 39.
In contrast, the Romans, who were not as accomplished in speculative phi-
losophy as the Greeks, were far better lawyers. They built a legal system which
outlasted their vast empire and became the foundation of most of the major con-
temporary legal systems of the world, especially the Western ones. It was the
Romans who encouraged and perfected legal representation into a highly skilled
art.
7. Others who took up Stoic philosophy were the Roman senator of Spanish
origin, Seneca; the Greek slave, Epictetus; and Emperor Marcus Aurelius (2 A.D.).
8. STONE, supra note 6, at 40.
9. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF
SOCIAL THEORY 76-77 (1976).
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kind-which they in turn incorporated into the corpus of Ro-
man jurisprudence.' °
When the Roman Empire collapsed, the Christian church
moved in to fill the vacuum as an umbrella authority over
Europe. This form of "international order"--the Respublica
Christiana-was also founded upon natural law, with a dis-
tinctly theological twist as a system of norms emanating, ulti-
mately, from God. The Respublica Christiana endured for a
thousand years, but despite Thomas Aquinas's best efforts, it
could not withstand the onslaught of Aristotelian philoso-
phy," the Renaissance, and the Reformation. It was brought
to a violent end by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).
From the ashes of this war came the modern state sys-
tem-but its emergence was not phoenix-like; its normative
foundation was painstakingly constructed out of natural law by
Hugo Grotius. 2 Grotius wrested natural law from divine ordi-
nation and drew from it norms to govern sovereign states new-
ly emerging from their tussle with the universal church and
unwilling to submit to either positive or divine law.'3 As the
10. The classic statement is found in GAIUS, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW (Ed-
ward Poste trans., 1991):
1. CONCERNING CIVIL AND NATURAL LAW
(1) All peoples who are ruled by laws and customs partly make
of their own laws, and partly have recourse to those which are common
to all men; for what every people establishes as law for itself is peculiar
to itself, and is called the Civil Law, as being that peculiar to the State;
and what natural reason establishes among all men and is observed by
all peoples alike, is called the Law of Nations, as being the law which
all nations employ ....
11. After the Dark Ages, Greek philosophy returned to Europe by a circuitous
route through Syria, Persia, and Arabia, regaining contact with the Christian West
in Spain. Its return to Europe is a tribute to Muslim-Al Kindi (circa 801-873), Al
Farabi (circa 870-950), Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (980-1037), and Averroes (Ibn Rushd)
(1126-1198)--and Jewish (Moses Maimonides) (1135-1204) scholars. Like Thomas
Aquinas, they too were trying to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with their faith.
12. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURI BELLI Ac PAcis LIBRi TRES, translated in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James B. Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
1964). See also Myres S. McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1, 8 (1989).
13. For Grotius, consent as expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda
(norm of international law created by custom) was central to the binding force of
international law, but its ultimate basis was natural law. JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY,
THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY THE
LATE JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY 10 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1958).
But it would be an overstatement to say that Grotius was the originator of
all international law. As already noted, his work had its roots in the Graeco-Ro-
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old order was dying and a new one was struggling to emerge,
Grotius stepped into the breach and created an international
legal system which has endured for almost half a millennium.
The sovereign state which emerged victorious from the
Thirty Years War was unassailable both externally and inter-
nally. Externally, its will was not subject to that of another.
Internally, it was not accountable to the will or interests of the
flesh and blood men and women within its borders. Rulers
claimed their right to rule from God-not from their subjects.
Thus, in 1609, King James I of England could boast in Par-
liament:
Kings are justly called gods, for they exercise a manner or
resemblance of divine power upon the earth: for if you consid-
er the attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the
person of a king. God hath power to create or destroy, make
or unmake at his pleasure, and to God are both soul and
body due. And the like power have kings: they make and
unmake their subjects, they have power of raising and cast-
ing down, of life and of death, judges over all their subjects
and in all causes and yet accountable to no one but God only.
They have power to exalt low things, and make of their sub-
jects, like men at the chess-a pawn to take a bishop or a
knight-and to cry up or down any of their subjects, as they
do their money. And to the king is due both the affection of
the soul and the service of the body of his subjects .... 14
In France, as in England, monarchs claimed divine authority
to rule. They believed that their will was identical to the. will
of the state as succinctly expressed in Louis XIV's famous
maxim: L'etat, c'est moi."5
Then came the revolutions. From England-where Charles
I, a staunch believer in the divine right of Kings, was charged,
man tradition. Besides, other civilizations-such as the Indian and the Chi-
nese-already had mature concepts of international law. A.M. CONNELLY, THE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 251 (1980).
14. SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 293-95 (G.W.
Prothero ed., 1913).
15. In Europe, at this time, this kind of absolutism was both anachronistic
and shortsighted for a number of circumstances showed that it was doomed: the
decline of ecclesiastical authority; the mercantilist spirit and freely trading individ-
uals acquiring property; the pioneering English documents such as Magna Carta;
and the philosophical doctrines about the Rights of Man which were taking shape
within the matrix of natural law.
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tried for treason by Parliament, found guilty, and
hanged-with its English Declaration of Rights in 1689, to the
American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789, internal
sovereignty was transferred from ruler to subject-turned-citi-
zen. External sovereignty, however, remained more or less
with the state, and up until the Second World War, only
states, not individuals, could be subjects of international law. 6
16. Before 1945, international- law embodied a number of limited but impor-
tant provisions for the protection of human rights. Professor Louis B. Sohn notes
that treaties dating as far back as 450 B.C.-such as that between the Corinthian
Greek cities of Oeantheia and Chalaeum--contained a sprinkling of human-rights
norms. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982). Progressively more
salient provisions began to appear in treaties and conventions. For instance, reli-
gious freedom was featured in the Treaty of Augsburg of 1555; the Treaty between
the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden concluded under the Westphalian peace set-
tlement of 1648; the Treaty of Olivia of 1660 concluded between Sweden, Poland
and Russia; and the Treaties of Nymegen (1678) and Ryswyck (1697) concluded
between France and Holland. Even more extensive provisions were incorporated in
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, providing not
only for religious liberty, but also for civil rights and the protection of minorities.
PIETER N. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS: THE REALIZATION OF INDIVID-
UAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17 (1965). Protection of
minorities, abolition of slavery, and humanitarian law were featured in many other
major treaties prior to 1945. The latter two notions were indeed the subject of
independent conventions of their own: the International Convention on the Aboli-
tion of Slavery and the Slave Trade concluded on September 25, 1926, under the
auspices of the League of Nations, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, and the Geneva (Red Cross)
Conventions on the Conduct of Warfare of August 22, 1864, which, with substan-
tial revisions in 1909 and 1929, continued in operation until they were replaced by
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. RED CROSS CONVENTION, reprinted in THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 187-91 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
Nor were pre-1945 human rights provisions in treaties restricted to tradi-
tional civil and political rights. Part 13 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 provid-
ed for the establishment of the International Labour Organization to promote bet-
ter working conditions for men and women. This august body has since spawned
many conventions and standards relating to the work place. It should not be for-
gotten, too, that the right to self-determination made an early appearance during
these peace-treaty negotiations at the end of the First World War. The old terra
nullius (literally, territory belonging to no one) doctrine, which had legitimized
colonial annexation of territory abroad to serve the interests of the annexing colo-
nial power-the spirit of the Berlin Conference of 1885-was to give way to the
call for decolonization and independence, which, for many colonies, came within
the first 50 years after the end of the First World War.
Apart from treaty obligations, general international law also recognized the
right of states to protect their nationals abroad-even to the extent of waging war
against another state on whose territory violations occurred-as well as the corre-
lative duty of states not to mistreat alien nationals within their borders. But
states were not entirely free to mistreat their own nationals either. With regard to
these individuals, international law accorded states the limited right of humanitar-
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Writing on the eve of the First World War Oppenheim makes
this point forcefully:
Several writers maintain that the law of nations guarantees
to every individual at home and abroad the so-called rights of
mankind, without regarding whether an individual be state-
less or not, or whether he be a subject of a member-state of
the Family of Nations or not. Such rights are said to com-
prise the right of existence, the right to protection of honour,
life, health, liberty, and property, the right of practicing any
religion one likes, the right of emigration, and the like. But
such rights do not in fact enjoy any guarantee whatever from
the Law of Nations, and they cannot enjoy such guarantee
since the Law of Nations is a law between States, and since
individuals cannot be subjects of this Law. 17
Intrastate sovereignty in Europe and America had begun to
give way to the sovereignty of the people, but at the interna-
tional level sovereignty remained as unyielding to human in-
terests as ever.
B. World Order Models Before 1989: Grotian versus
Clausewitzian Paradigms
Between 1945 and 1989, two paradigms competed for con-
trol of the world order: the normative paradigm (Grotian), and
the realist paradigm (Clausewitzian).8 The Grotian, or nor-
mative, paradigm posits a world order permeated by, and ori-
ented toward, justice; in Grotius's time justice was, of course,
natural law, and natural law was a transcendent, not an an-
thropocentric, system. But in our own time justice bears the
decidedly homocentric imprint of seventeenth and eighteenth
ian intervention in the territory of a state whose treatment of its own citizens was
of such magnitude as to shock the conscience of mankind. Although its existence
and scope have never been beyond controversy among jurists, the right of humani-
tarian intervention was familiar even to ancient China where Mencius supported
the idea of liberation from tyrants. The right of humanitarian intervention was
repeatedly exercised in Europe during the nineteenth century.
17. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 367-68 (2d ed. 1912). See, how-
ever, the modified view in the 7th edition of Oppenheim's International Law edited
by H. Lauterpacht. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (Hersch Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1952).
18. Grotian here signifies not the international law or system of sovereign
states that Grotius built, but rather the normative stance of his project. See Falk,
Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 408-09.
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century revolutions. 9  Today, justice would thus mean
human 0 justice and would entail some version of human dig-
nity and human rights as foundational normative concepts. By
contrast, the Clausewitzian world order is predicated upon a
Machiavellian emphasis on power and strategy, with little
concern for normative or moral questions; it is built on the
factual "is" rather than the normative "ought"21 of world or-
dering.
1. The Grotian Foundation of the Post-1945 Order
The international legal system which Grotius built rested
on the twin normative principles of state sovereignty and pacta
sunt servanda. At Westphalia, the intrinsic sovereignty of
states as a normative concept made perfect sense. A system of
sovereign states was the guarantee that one of the most brutal
wars Europe had ever seen-the Thirty Years War-would not
occur again. Oh, the other hand, the intrinsic dignity of men
and women made in the image of God had not yet crossed over
from the theological to the moral and political realms. And
even if it had, it would not have entailed any "rights," let alone
natural or inalienable ones, for the notion of human beings as
19. Grotius, in fact, built the bridge between the transcendent and
anthropocentric phases of natural law:
The law of nature, again, given is unchangeable--even in the sense that
it cannot be changed by God. Measureless as is the power of God, never-
theless it can be said that there are certain things over which that pow-
er does not extend; for things of which this is said are spoken only,
having no sense corresponding with reality and being mutually contradic-
tory. Just as even God, then, cannot cause that two times two should not
make four, so He cannot cause that which is intrinsically to be not evil.
GROTIUS, supra note 12, at 40.
20. To the pre-Socratic Milesian school of Greek philosophers, justice was still
conceived as a kind of natural balance or equilibrium: a natural law directed both
at man and God enjoining them not to overstep "eternally-fixed boundaries."
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 27 (1946). The Pythago-
reans conceived of justice in terms of equality. Later still, Platonic Greek philos-
ophers came to regard justice as "an ethical principle for human conduct, a specifi-
cally )human virtue." STONE, supra note 6, at 12. Aristotle placed justice finally
and squarely in the context of human relations but anthropocentric natural law
came into its own only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
21. For a discussion of the "is-ought" question and David Hume's famous
thesis that a norm cannot be logically derived from or reduced to a fact (really
another way of saying that conclusions are already contained in the premises), see
THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY (W.D. Hudson ed., 1969).
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bearers of rights had not been invented; the very idea of rights
and correlative duties was a feat of abstraction which not even
the Romans achieved. To be sure, the Thirty Years War was a
stage in the process which eventually freed the individual from
the absolute hegemony of church and state. But the English
Revolution was still forty years away, and the American and
French Revolutions, with their lofty Declarations of the Rights
of Man and their notions of a social contract between citizens
and the state, well over a century into the future.
In a dramatic break with this past, the post-World War II
order was explicitly built upon the normative foundation of
human dignity and human rights. This triumph-of natural
law over the positivism that had enjoyed pre-eminence for
most of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth cen-
turies -- was due to specific historical circumstances.
22. Natural law had been the ideology that sustained European revolutions
and the doctrine of natural rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
But soon the doctrine of natural rights ran into rough waters. Politically, the
revolutionary spirit which had nurtured natural rights waned in disillusionment
and frustration in the wake of the Jacobin terror which led to Napoleonic central-
ism and authoritarianism in France. Philosophically, the doctrine came under at-
tack from the incisive pens of those two positivist-empiricist philosophers par ex-
cellence-Auguste Comte and Leon Duguit in France-George Hegel in Germany,
and most particularly Jeremy Bentham, in England whose unremitting contempt
for the natural rights doctrine is captured in the oft-quoted view that the notion
of natural and imprescriptible rights was "nonsense upon stilts." Jeremy Bentham,
Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 WORKS 491 (Bowring ed., 1838-43) (an essay he wrote in
response to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1791).
Indeed, the thesis that there were no rights apart from legal rights and
that therefore the notion of rights anterior, or contrary, to law was an absurdity
"became for a time part of conventional wisdom and was accepted as a truism by
many English social thinkers," even those only peripherally interested in political
philosophy such as the poet and critic, Matthew Arnold. H.L.A. Hart, The Shell
Foundation Lectures, 1978-1979: Utilitarianism and Human Rights 53 TUL. L. REV.
663, 669 (1979). Thus, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a general
eclipse of natural-law-type theories and the ascendancy of positivist-empiricist ones,
of which utilitarianism was among the most influential. With this decline in natu-
ral law thinking, there was also a general shift in the basis of human rights
norms and standards of justice from the metaphysical to the empirical, from the
absolutist to the relativist, and from the universalist to the particularist. STONE,
supra note 6, at 4-5.
Far from confirming the final demise of the natural rights doctrine (or of
natural law philosophy generally), however, subsequent history has shown that the
doctrine was simply in abeyance before its great revival later in the'twentieth
century. The experiences and horrors of the Second World War, especially the Nazi
Holocaust under the aegis of positivism, showed the starkest depth of a popular
philosophy gone wrong. As a result, attention was turned again to natural law
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It is normal after a great war for a new political order to
emerge among nations. This is a feature which the Second
World War shares with previous major wars; the chaos and
destruction of war always give rise to a yearning for peace and
frantic efforts to devise measures that might prevent a reap-
pearance of hostilities." The uniqueness of the Second World
War lies in the fact that, more than any other major war in
history, it was ostensibly waged and fought in defense of hu-
man rights and dignity which Adolf Hitler had trampled un-
derfoot with impunity at home-even as he let his expansion-
ary zeal run riot abroad. Granted, it was not so much Hitler's
atrocities at home as his adventures abroad which provided
the main impetus to arms for his opponents,24 but one matter
remains clear: if defense of their national security was the
opposition's main motivation, the threat to human dignity and
rights supplied a ready moral justification for the Allied war
effort which dislodged Nazism and its allies. Statements and
declarations made at various stages of the war bear this out.
An example was the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, later
endorsed by forty-seven nations, which embodied the hope for
a peace with commensurate guarantees for the safety of all
and its transcendent norms; it is this revival of natural-law thinking which gave
ascendancy to the concept of human rights in international law.
23. Thus, out of the ruins of the Thirty Years War, which devastated Europe
between 1618 and 1648, came the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, the birth of the
modem state system, and the very foundations of modern international law in the
work of Grotius. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna
which convened in 1815 was also to witness a call for a new order to guard
against the dangers revealed in the old; those dangers were, of course, perceived
differently then and differently guarded against-by a supra-national system of
four European powers consisting of England, Prussia, Austria, Russia (and later
France) to police Europe and preserve the status quo. Similarly, in the twentieth
century, the League of Nations-predecessor to the United Nations-was formed in
the wake of the First World War. Its structure was the first part of the Treaty of
Versailles of 1919 and contained some of the features of the present international
system. This pattern of order following chaos seems to vindicate Toynbee's "chal-
lenge-and-response" theory of the origin of human civilizations. ARNOLD J.
TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (2d ed. 1935). The first four volumes were pub-
lished in 1934, the next three in 1939, the following four in 1954, and the last
two in 1959 and 1961. There are also useful abridgments of the first ten volumes
by D.C. Somerwell and a re-issued, illustrated version. In other places, Toynbee
refers to his "challenge and response" theory as the "virtue of adversity." Id. at
27.
24. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS
AND HUMAN HOPES (1974). The same could be said of the wars that dislodged Pol
Pot in Kampuchea and Idi Amin in Uganda.
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nations and the assurance of a life free from fear and want to
all people in every land. Another was the Declaration by the
UN signed on January 1, 1942; this was a statement by repre-
sentatives of twenty-six nations then fighting in the war, later
adhered to by twenty-one others, in which the signatories ex-
pressed the conviction that total victory over the Axis powers
was essential "to defend life, liberty, independence and reli-
gious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in
their own lands as well as in other lands .... ."" A recent UN
report on human rights activities sums up the position as fol-
lows:
The Second World War proved to many the close relationship
between outrageous behavior by a Government towards its
own citizens and aggression against other nations, between
respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace. The
experience of the war resulted in the widespread conviction
that the effective international protection of human rights
was an essential condition of international peace and prog-
ress.
26
It is this conviction-that peace and human rights are
intertwined-which persisted to become, at the end of the war,
the cornerstone of the new international order set up in the
Charter of the UN of 1945. In this foundation instrument-the
supreme expression ofjus cogens (peremptory norms), in inter-
national law27 -the signatories resolved, among other things,
25. UNITED NATIONS AcTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS at 5, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/2IRev. 2, U.kI. Sales No. E.83.XIV.2 (1983) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS
AcTION].
26. Id.
27. See Louis B. Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 18 (1978).
The germ of that idea had been implanted several years before when, in
August 1941, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt met Winston Chur-
chill aboard the Prince of Wales, and issued the Atlantic Charter-the forerunner
of the UN Charter. The Atlantic Charter incorporated Roosevelt's famous four free-
doms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom
from fear. Later at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations in 1944-between represen-
tatives from the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States (from 21 Au-
gust to 28 September) and between the latter two and the representative from
China (from 29 September to 7 October)-proposals were drawn up for a UN orga-
nization committed to the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The General Assembly was to be charged with responsibility for this
function, but (under its authority) an Economic and Social Council would be given
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"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought, untold sorrow to mankind,
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small.... .2 ' In the
same document, the objectives laid down for the UN included
the principles of "equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples" and "promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion. '' 29 Article 55 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations spells out this human rights mission
of the UN:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and con-
ditions of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health,
and related problems; and international cultural and
educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion. °
Further, in Article 56, all the members of the UN "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
power to act on these matters, on its own initiative.
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were the foundation for the fifty-nation UN
Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco beginning on April
25, 1945. Some delegations at this conference-including representatives from Chi-
le, Cuba, and Panama-urged for the inclusion and guarantee of specific human
rights in the Charter of the UN itself. But in the end, the Conference decided not
to include a bill of rights in the Charter on the ground that such a bill required
more time and consideration than was possible during the discussion on the basic
document. John P. Humphry, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its
History and Judicial Character, in AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (B.G.
Ramcharan ed., 1979)
28. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
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forth in Article 55.''1 Altogether, there are no less than seven
references to human rights in the Charter of the UN.
The new commitment to human rights reflected in the
above foundation documents also pervaded the agenda of the
earliest UN activities. In conformity with the Economic and
Social Council's Resolution 9(11) of June 21, 1946, peace trea-
ties such as those made with Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland,
Italy, and Romania (all signed on February 10, 1947) contained
a commitment to fundamental human rights. Similarly, post-
war trusteeship agreements included an express commitment
"to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental free-
dom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."32 But, perhaps, the act most symbolic of the new
ethos was the apprehension, trial, and punishment of individu-
als guilty of committing human rights atrocities-under the
rubric of "war-crimes and crimes against humanity"--in the
Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials. These imposed liability upon
individuals even if their crimes were committed in the service
of their states.33 The corollary of these trials was the positive
assistance rendered to the surviving victims of these atrocities.
The above pronouncements, documents, acts, and events
together constituted a new ethos in international relations: a
foundation for a new world order and new world body, the
United Nations, for the promotion and protection of human
rights. 4 The Second World War had thus installed flesh and
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
32. See those agreements approved by the UN General Assembly on December
13, 1946 for Togoland (British administration), Togoland (French administration),
the Cameroons (British administration), the Cameroons (French administration),
Tanganyika (British administration), Western Samoa (New Zealand administration),
Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian administration), and New Guinea (Australian administra-
tion); the one approved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947 for the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands as a strategic Trust Territory (United States ad-
ministration); those approved by the General Assembly on November 1, 1947 for
Nauru (Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom administration on behalf
of Australia); and on December 1, 1950 for Somaliland (Italian administration).
The subsequent fate of these trust territories was not always a happy one. UNITED
NATIONS ACTION, supra note 25, at 7.
33. See Hans W. Baade, Individual Responsibility, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (VOL. IV): THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT 291 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1972); RICHARD FALK,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 195 (1981).
34. Moreover, the human rights which came to be accepted in international
law were not just the libertarian political rights which had been so important to
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blood men and women as subjects of international law, and
sought to extend the erosions of the intrastate sovereignty we
saw earlier, to the whole world, by a process which would
inevitably diminish external sovereignty as well.
2. The Clausewitzian Ascendancy
The human rights roots of the post-Second World War
order need to be emphasized, but in doing so it would be a
mistake to overlook its still robust Westphalian dimension.
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter attempted to preserve
Westphalian sovereignty as follows: "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter .... .35
However, it soon became the manifesto of rogues36 in the field
of human rights. More seriously, the cold war soon set in and
pushed both the normative and institutional (legal) dimensions
of the world order aside, leaving only the power-political di-
mension to provide support for this one-legged stool. The re-
sulting order rested not on legal or moral norms, but on the
threat of nuclear annihilation. Almost every incident and every
human aspiration, be it protest against apartheid or an exist-
ing regime, was seen through the distortion of the cold war
lens.
The UN itself was thoroughly paralyzed: the General As-
sembly, by ideological blocs; the Security Council, by the Su-
perpower veto. While this gridlock lasted, dictators and rogues
sprouted all over the world and wreaked untold brutality upon
their people with the utmost impunity. The promise of a new
era of human dignity and human rights which had arisen from
the ashes of the Holocaust soon receded before the unre-
strained exercise of state power outside the UN system-with
no regard for legality. States, large and small, thumbed their
merchantilists in their struggle against the state; they included an unprecedented
synthesis of nineteenth and twentieth century social and economic rights as well.
See Louis B. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 5-29 (1978).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
36. It has been invoked repeatedly by states guilty of violations of human
rights: for instance, South Africa (defending its apartheid system), the former Sovi-
et Union, and Uganda's Idi Amin regime.
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noses at the UN: Clausewitzian realism had truly trumped
Grotian normativity, as the world descended further and fur-
ther into a Hobbesian wilderness. As for the human rights
norms at the foundation of the post-1945 order, doubts were
voiced even as to their validity as imperative legal norms.37
3. Theoretical Perspectives
But not all commentators shared the bleak view that the
cold war interlude meant that the world scene was, and could
only be, a Hobbesian wilderness. Louis B. Sohn, for instance,
described some protagonists of the Clausewitzian view as
"members of the younger generation of international lawyers,
born after the 1940's holocaust and not seeming to understand
the importance of international protection of human rights,
trying to turn the clock back."" In particular, even in the
shadow of the cold war, a number of leading international law
scholars such as Louis Henkin still insisted on a human rights
dimension for the post-World War II order.39 Others put for-
ward normative models for world ordering, the most well-
known being those of Wilfred Jenks,4" Myres McDougal,4
and Richard Falk."
Wilfred Jenks's world order model was predicated upon
norms which had already filtered into the various legal sys-
tems of humankind. Rather like the Roman Praetor Peregrinus
fashioning the jus gentium from basic elements and principles
in the local laws which were common to all, Jenks conceived of
37. See, Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal
Order, 6 HoFsTRA L. REV. 269 (1978); Eric Lane, Mass Killing by Governments:
Lawful in the World Legal Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 239 (1979); James
S. Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article
2(7) of the U.N. Charter, 71 AMI. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977).
38. Louis B. Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent
Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347 (1981). See also Lowell F. Schechter, The Views
of "Chartervists" and "Skeptics" on Human Rights in the World Legal Order: Two
Wrongs Don't Make a Right, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 357 (1981).
39. See HENKIN, supra note 34.
40. See C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958).
41. MYERS S. McDoUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 295
(1960); Myers S. McDougal et al., Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INTL L. 188 (1968); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET
AL., HUmAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
42. See RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975).
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the world legal order as being built upon a similar
"multicultural, multi-legal" juristic effort. In his vision, as Jul-
ius Stone summarized it:
[T]he contents of international law are seen as determined by
the interplay, comparison, synthesis, and manipulation of
legal rules, principles, conceptions, and policies found among
the various human societies. The tasks of both doctrinal writ-
ers and decisionmakers are here given a magistral autonomy
in revealing a body of data consisting of legal ideas shared by
[hu]mankind generally.43
McDougal's scheme resembles Jenks's in its focus on the nor-
mative content of world order which McDougal finds in his
values of human dignity: power, respect, enlightenment,
wealth, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and sinceiity. As
fundamental human values, these are supposed to provide a
universal normative foundation for the world legal order. 4
But McDougal's scheme is more ambitious than Jenks's in that
it reaches beyond the institutional legal norms to the underly-
ing moral and social strata.
Richard Falk's model is different from both in that it fo-
cuses less on posited content, and more on the framework for
generating truly homocentric norms for a world order that
would bypass the nation-state. It has been suggested that
although Falk's world order bears certain similarities to
Jenks's in its lack of faith in state consensus or cooperation,
and with McDougal's in its rejection of states as the exclusive
"law-creators," Falk "begins at points beyond where Jenks and
McDougal stopped short."45 Falk's solution is a temporal evo-
lution of world ordering from dependence upon sovereign states
to the global consciousness of "a single interdependent plane-
tary community."41
43. JULIUS STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BETWEEN STATE POWER AND
HuriAN JUSTICE 11 (1984) [hereinafter STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER].
44. These are rather like Hart's minimum content of natural law, H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961), which are in fact Hobbesian, based on
the premise that people do desire to live-so that our concern is "with social ar-
rangements for continued existence, not with those of a suicide club." Id. at 188.
See also Prakash Sinha's needs of humanity's planetary existence, Prakash Sinha,
The Anthropocentric Theory of International Law as a Basis for Human Rights 10
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469 (1978).
45. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at 33.
46. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at 33. For this view
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What Jenks, McDougal, and Falk have in common is not
just their Grotian espousal of the normative over the realist
view of world ordering; it is also their answer to Stone's ques-
tion of whether the global justice-constituency consists of
states or human beings. Their answer is that it is human be-
ings who must ultimately count. Their differences are in how
this would or ought to happen.
In his Visions of World Order: Between State Power and
Human Justice,4' a book which won an award from the Amer-
ican Society of International Law, the late Professor Julius
Stone wrote a thorough critique of each of the three normative
models of world order above-especially of their homocentric
foundation in a world still dominated by "the arrogance of
sovereignty."s His verdict was that sovereign states were not
about to wither away, and as long as they endured, an insur-
mountable barrier to any meaningful planetary community
was firmly in place. A world in which interposed state entities
insulated national populations from each other was not amena-
ble to the sociological enquiries necessary to map out a global,
homocentric justice-constituency. In Stone's view, the attempts
by Jenks, McDougal, and Falk did not succeed in reaching
beyond Clausewitzian fortresses to build a normative world
order. He closes his analysis with this unanswered dilemma:
Stone cites from Falk's, Statecraft in an Era of World Order, Decay and Renewal,
Arthur F. Yencken Memorial Lectures, Australian National University, 1974:
Put simply, the planet is too crowded, its resource base too constrained,
its social structure too hierarchical, and its political structure fragmented
and overly responsive to the concerns and interests of dominant groups
to allow for an easy transition to a global community where the needs of
the species for survival with dignity could be established. As such, the
pressures are mounted against mechanisms ill-conceived for such global
integration, and the options narrow to various frantic efforts to stare of
disintegration, by refusing to heed the formulated aspirations of peoples.
Can this holding operation of the State system succeed? Do we as citi-
zens of a given time and place and members of a species want such a
strategy to work during our lifetime? Are there alternatives for the fu-
ture that transform world order without breaking it asunder? .... New
sparks of political consciousness must be struck if we are going to be
able to effectuate a world order solution that serves the interests of the
human species as a whole. The only viable moral premise for politics in
the sociological age is an anthropological one.
STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at 33.
47. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43.
48. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at 156.
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This conclusion again returns us to basic presuppositions of
any careful inquiry concerning international justice. How far
can we get with such an enterprise before we succeed in
delineating the membership of an international justice con-
stituency? And what constituency can we delineate here that
will simultaneously embrace the human claims involved and
the rather inescapable interposing authority of state
decisionmakers... ?49
As for the postwar promise of a homocentric world order, he
notes, rightly, that "many euphoric post-1945 expectations of
international law and the United Nations have faded, at this
time of writing, into mere banalities if not hypocrisies of
speeches at the opening of each year's General Assembly.""
Now, of course, Stone was right. The world order of 1984
was a Hobbesian wilderness. The Clausewitzian ascendancy in
the wake of the cold war had eclipsed human interests behind
the curtain of an intransigent sovereignty. In this world, deep
doubts of an existential kind, over whether Westphalian inter-
national law could serve human interests were, indeed, well-
founded.
But the world order Stone described in 1984 had all but
disappeared by 1990. Its central logic of a nuclear stand-off
between Washington and Moscow had vanished overnight; the
confidence that dictators and rogue regimes could hitch their
survival to cold war allegiances could no longer be taken for
granted; the Berlin wall had crumbled as did apartheid in
South Africa; and the plight of peoples all over the world now
has a direct claim upon the resources of a reinvigorated,
though financially struggling, UN. The march of events seems
to lead toward a Grotian, not a Clausewitzian, world order. We
are, indeed, living in another Grotian moment. Old orthodoxies
are gone and a mountain of scholarly work and intelligence
data are obsolete. Change, even for the better, is disorient-
ing-but this is not the occasion for nostalgic yearnings for
those days when we had "reliable enemies."5' The present
cries out rather for Grotian minds to wrest a new order from
the prevailing chaos, and to grapple afresh with the question of
49. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at 156.
50. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 43, at xv.
51. Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 331.
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human justice which Stone raised in less hospitable times. As
for Stone's account, I sometimes wish that my much-admired
teacher had lived a few more years to lend his exemplary clari-
ty of thought to this project.
III. NEW PARADIGMS: GROTIAN VERSUS CARTESIAN
The end of the cold war has, at least temporarily, dis-
armed the Clausewitzian challenge to the Grotian project, but
a new challenge has arisen to take its place. The new chal-
lenge is postmodernist nihilism, which has its roots in the
epistemic skepticism of Ren6 Descartes,52 a contemporary of
Grotius. It has been said that when two men look out of a
prison window, one sees the stars while the other sees the
mud. Looking upon the crises of their time, Grotius worked on
a possibility of a normative order while Descartes doubted the
existence of everything except his own mind: cogito, ergo sum
(I think, therefore I am). Cartesian skepticism is built upon
some rather serious epistemological mistakes;" it is certainly
at odds with what we know today about how the brain
works-its perception and conceptualization, and especially its
creation of patterns and catchments of meaning.54 The Carte-
sian dualism of body and mind-which Descartes took from
Plato and gave a radically new twist55-- may also be, in the
light of current knowledge, untenable. "Finding a prior
philosopher's conclusions untenable," Mortimer Adler counsels,
"the thing to do is to go back to his starting point and see if he
has made a little error in the beginning."56 Subsequent phi-
losophers did not do this. Instead, building upon Descartes's
skeptical foundation of modern Western philosophy, Locke,
52. French Philosopher and Mathematician, 1596-1650.
53. See generally MORTIMER ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES (1985).
54. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING AND COGNITION (1987);
JEREMY CAMPBELL, THE IMPROBABLE MACHINE: WHAT THE UPHEAVALS IN ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH REVEAL ABouT How THE MIND REALLY WORKS
(1989); JOHN L. CASTI, PARADIGMS LOST: TACKLING THE UNANSWERED MYSTERIES
OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989).
55. Descartes's dualism is characterized by "disengagement" of one part from
the other. See Charles Taylor, Inwardness and the Culture of Modernity, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 88,
98 (Axel Honneth et al. eds. & William Rehg trans., 1992) [hereinafter PHILOSOPH-
ICAL INTERVENTIONS].
56. ADLER, supra note 53, at 193.
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Hume, and Kant compounded Cartesian errors. As Colin Wil-
son notes:
After Hume, philosophy faced a blank wall. Descartes at least
had left a basis for certainty: "I think, therefore I am." Hume
replied: 'That does not prove that you exist at all." Berkeley
had got rid of the outside world; now Hume got rid of the
mind as well. Reason had proved to be a kind of forest fire
that ended by consuming everything. Descartes's principle of
doubt left nothing standing.5"
Conceived as an attack on the Enlightenment, especially
its human-centered liberal notions such as human rights and
law, postmodernism is the contemporary version of that for-
est fire razing all canons to the ground. There are many
strands in postmodernist theory, of course, but all have their
conceptual arsenals trained on this common target. They are
also distinguished by the weaponry in these arsenals:
"[d]econstruction," "[d]ecanonization," "[i]ndeterminacy,"
"[s]elflessness," "[d]epthlessness," "[i]rony," "[h]ybrid-
ization,"59 and above all "incredulity toward meta-narra-
tives."60
In law, postmodernism takes the form of Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) which brings the tenets above into the legal
context. CLS, for instance, sees international law as hopelessly
indeterminate and incoherent.6' In the context of the interna-
57. COLIN WILSON, BEYOND THE OUTSIDER 51 (1991).
58. There is serious confusion in postmodernist theories as to whether the
attack is against Enlightenment, "essentialist" anthropocentrism, or against mod-
ernism: the two are not the same. Indeed, the modernist positivism and scientism
of nineteenth and early twentieth century thought was an attack on seventeenth
and eighteenth century anthropocentric natural law. See supra note 22.
59. MARGARET ROSE, THE POST-MODERN AND THE POST-INDUSTRIAL A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 52-53 (1991).
60. Id. at 55.
61. For an excellent but sympathetic account of the CLS movement, see Gary
Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1993). For CLS in
international law, see generally Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public In-
ternational Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81 (1992). Purvis seems, in places, to use
the term "modernism" for what is commonly understood as "postmodernism," but
even nomenclature here is not without its difficulties. See ROSE, supra note 59, at
3-39.
The confusion of targets identified in postmodernist theories also bedevils
CLS. See supra note 58. For instance, in his enlightening article, Gary Minda
seems to show that CLS takes one strand of jurisprudential thought and mistakes
it for all jurisprudence. The attack is on moderns who saw law as "an autono-
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tional legal order of the post-cold war era, CLS looks out of the
prison window of current uncertainties and sees nothing but
pure mud. One CLS view, for instance, suggests that Eastern
Europe "will arrive at the station marked 'market democracy'
just after the train has departed for 'post-industrial' soci-
ety."62 To understand CLS claims against international law
and the possibility of a normative world order, we need to turn
to the basic tenets of the postmodern paradigm in which it is
rooted. Postmodernist themes rest upon three tenets: epistemo-
logical skepticism, existential dread, and a liberationist agen-
da. How compelling are these tenets? Let us take a closer look
at each of them.
A. Epistemological Skepticism
The postmodernist case for epistemic skepticism proceeds
in several stages. It begins with Saussurian structuralism
which insisted, earlier in this century, that we do not appre-
hend external objects directly, that our perception is always
one remove from the outside world, and that the meanings we
attach to external objects are mediated by the internal struc-
ture of our language. The meaning of the word "dog," for in-
stance, has less to do with the four-legged animal we are famil-
iar with, than with the position of that word as a noun in the
English language." The linguistic structure is everything.
Postmodernism takes this structuralist non-referentiality
(i.e., language having no direct reference to the real world) as a
device for enthroning the kingdom of writing so that, as
mous, self-generating activity [and believed] that a distinct legal method [was]
discoverable and that such a method would unlock the door to the ultimate truths
of the law." Minda, supra. But surely only legal positivists like Austin Kelsen and
Hart-and their attacker Ronald Dworkin-might fit this bill; but would Roscoe
Pound or Julius Stone or the Realist Movement?
62. David Kennedy, Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architec-
tures, 32 HARV. INTL L. J. 373, 396 (1991).
63. TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 17 (1977). There are
some overtones of Locke here. See ADLER, supra note 53. But Adler suggests:
A meaningful word, a notation with significance, is a sign. A sign func-
tions by presenting to the mind for its attention an object other than
itself. Thus, when I utter the word "dog," you not only hear the word
itself, but hearing the word serves to bring before your mind the object
thus named.
ADLER, supra note 53, at 60-61.
1993]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Jacques Derrida insists, there is nothing outside the text,64
for "text" here means not just the usual forms of writing such
as literature or law; its domain extends, metaphorically, to all
reality and all human experience. In his Of Grammatology,
Derrida, citing Rabbi Eliezer, shows how writing can be con-
ceived in this way:
If all the seas were of ink, and all ponds planted with reeds,
if the sky and the earth were parchments and if all human
beings practised the art of writing-they would not exhaust
the Torah I have learned, just as the Torah itself would not
be diminished any more than is the sea by the water re-
moved by a paint brush dipped in it.6"
Writing and textuality thus comprehend all constructs, all
narratives, and meta-narratives that underwrite human dis-
course: art, culture, value-systems, law, and so forth. In
Derrida's view, even language itself cannot escape writing's
embrace: "By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly per-
ceptible, everything that for at least some twenty centuries
tended toward and finally succeeded in being gathered under
the name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred
to, or at least summarized under, the name of writing."66
But this structuralist gathering together of virtually all
reality into the text is only the first stage in the postmodernist
project. Postmodernist thinking is also post-structuralist and,
especially, post-Saussarian because it goes beyond an insis-
tence on the text-boundedness of meaning, and in the next
stage, deconstructs texts and makes textual meaning problem-
atic. It attempts to show that texts are what CLS folk claim
about international law and liberal notions such as rights,
liberty, and equality: indeterminate, incoherent, meaningless,
and internally at war with themselves. In other words, the
kingdom of writing is torn by civil war. With its Freudian
overtones, this stage takes place on the territory of "semiotics,"
64. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976).
65. Id. at 16. He also refers to Galileo: "It [the book of Nature] is written in
mathematical language"; Descartes: "to read in the great book of Nature . . . ";
Bonnet: "It would seem more philosophical to me to presume that our earth is a
book that God has given to intelligences far superior to ours to read, and where
they study in depth the infinitely multiplied and varied characters of His adorable
wisdom." Id.
66. Id. at 6.
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the domain of the signs (including words) we use to communi-
cate.
In traditional semiotics there are three principal features
in communication: (1) someone who wishes to communicate
something (the author, the speaker, the subject); (2) the words
or signs (the signifiers) he or she uses to convey the message;
and (3) the recipient of the message who understands it be-
cause he or she shares with the communicator the same lin-
guistic culture (they speak the same language). These three
features can be understood as production (authorship), text (or
signifier), and reception..
Deconstruction attempts to show that this model is illuso-
ry because the text or signifier is in fact divorced from both its
author and the reality it is presumed to represent (the signi-
fied) by the notion of "diffdrance"7 (a French word that can
mean both difference and deferral) and "supplementarity."68
No meaning can be determined outside context, and there are
two clusters of contexts here-production and reception-which
tend to "frame" the text:
Production Text
Context Signifier
But since no single context permits saturation-the text is
much richer than any of its interpretations-no single, stable,
or determinate meaning, whether intended by the author or
67. The term "difflrance" (spelt with an "a") has been described as 'perhaps
the most effective" in Derrida's "shifting battery of terms" because it is "suspended
between the two French verbs 'to differ' and 'to defer"; therefore,
language depends on "difference" since, as Saussure showed once and for
all, it consists in the structure of distinctive oppositions which make up
its basic economy. Where Derrida breaks new ground, and where the
science of grammatology takes its cue, is in the extent to which "differ"
shades into "defer." This involves the idea that meaning is always de-
ferred, perhaps to the point of an endless supplementarity, by the play of
signification. Diffdrance not only designates this theme but offers in its
own unstable meaning a graphic example of the process at work.
See CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTIQN: THEORY AND PRACTICE 32 (rev. ed.
1991). This book is probably the best explanation of "deconstruction."
68. DERRIDA, supra note 64, at 32.
Reception
Context
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read into it by the recipient, can be attributed to the text. The
text is thus freed from both author and reader, set adrift in a
sea of indeterminacy where it can yield a potpourri of mean-
ings for each reader to choose from. Every writing is supposed
to be a nest of two kinds of binary concepts eternally at war
with each other: those explicitly put there by authors or read
into it by recipients (texts) and those which they try to sup-
press or repress (subtexts, supplements). Deconstruction is the
process of uncovering these binary oppositions and the hierar-
chy which allows one kind to dominate its opposite. It reverses
the hierarchy to show that it is built not on sound philosoph-
ical foundations, but on metaphysics and suspect ideology. An
example of such suspect ideology is the "metaphysics of pres-
ence" which insists that the author's intentionality inhabits his
or her writing, and which privileges speech (where this seems
more so) over writing, where the author is less "present." In
fact, Derrida insists, diffdrance which frees the text from the
subject applies equally to speech and to writing. The ubiqui-
tous signifier cannot be pinned down any more by speakers
than by writers; it is, by nature, stubbornly itinerant.69
It is clear from this that all texts, literal or metaphorical,
now have a life of their own, and cannot be tied down to specif-
ic meanings. Even our road signs that read "Speed Limit 55
m.p.h." really do not mean that. Postmodernist deconstruction
thus denies the referentiality of texts, insists that the "itin-
erant" signifier cannot be held down long enough to say some-
thing, and rejects substantive normative discourse.70 It is as
if having lured meaning into the text, it has now blasted both
skyhigh.
The central epistemological problem for deconstructionists,
however, is: How to do this and still be able to put their own
message into words? How to stem the infinite regression of
69. For Derrida, unlike some of his disciples-for instance, those in the CLS
movement, who in the earlier phases of their movement, veered towards linguistic
idealism (the world being a creature of language)-this indeterminacy is somewhat
limited. See NORRIS, supra note 67, at 136-58. "Derrida's skepticism is not what
some of his interpreters would make of it, a passport to limitless interpretative
games of their own happy devising." NORRIS supra note 67, at 127.
70. RICHARD FREADMAN & SEUMAS MILLER, RE-THINKING THEORY: A CRITIQUE
OF CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORY AND AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 51 (1992). A
new work, JAMEs Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993), finds the roots of the
moral sense in human biology.
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meaning which they have set in motion? How to insist on the
incoherence, indeterminacy, and internal chaos of texts using
texts to do so? How to cut the signifier loose and still get it to
do what they want it to do in their own writings and speeches?
In other words, how can "deconstructive denial of 'logocentrism'
[be] expounded in wholly logocentric terms"?7 Skepticism
may thus "turn out to be self-refuting"72 caught in an old
children's game of circularities:
Caesar says that men are liars;
But Caesar is a man;
Therefore Caesar is a liar;
Therefore men are not liars;
But Caesar is a man;
Therefore Caesar is not a liar;
Therefore men are liars;
But Caesar is a man;
Therefore ....
The way out for postmodernism is the refuge taken by
every skeptic from Hume to Derrida: special pleading. In de-
fense of Derrida, Norris writes:
Skepticism in philosophy has always borne this ambigu-
ous relation to the "natural" or commonsense attitude. Its
proponents have never pretended that life could be conducted
in a practical way if everyone acted consistently on skeptical
assumptions .... Language continues to communicate, as life
goes on, despite all the problems thrown up by sceptical [sic]
thought.7"
In other words, "[t]he man sits on the branch, sawing away,
and we half-expect him to fall but he doesn't-it was only a toy
saw. " 74 Writing "under erasure" like)t(is part of this psy-
chedelic "now you see it, now you don't" ethic.
Few postmodernists would renounce their commitment to
practical outcomes; most, indeed, espouse a decidedly political
71. GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES 129 (1989).
72. NORRIS, supra note 67, at 126. See also MORTIMER ADLER, INTELLECT:
MIND OVER MATTER 131 (1990) (Deconstruction of words on a page "is as self-
refuting as the skeptical assertion that it is true or (or that it is false) that no
statement is either true or false"!.
73. NORRIS, supra note 67, at 128.
74. DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES 64 (1991).
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stance.75 But this practical claim sits rather uneasily with
epistemic agnosticism. It may be theoretically possible to argue
that the road sign which reads "Speed Limit 55 m.p.h." or
"Keep to Your Right" does not really "mean" that. But, trans-
ferring that epistemic skepticism to the highway could mean
the "deconstruction" not just of the road sign, but of driver and
vehicle as well.
In any event, philosophers' disclaimers of responsibility for
the consequences of their philosophy is another unfortunate
turn in modern philosophical discourse. The founders of philos-
ophy saw it not as a game, but as a serious search for guidance
on how to live. Socrates did not shrink from what he saw as
the consequences of his philosophy, even if the price was his
own life. But serious modern philosophers can say that our
lives are not real, not earnest, and the grave is "their goal,"
that "[1]ife may be not only meaningless but absurd," and still
go on as if what they had said mattered not a jot.76 When phi-
losophy is divorced from life and words lose their roots in hu-
man necessity, they need not be taken seriously.
"[P]hilosophers have a responsibility which they cannot abdi-
cate," a leading philosopher reminds us, "to stop merely sharp-
ening their tools and start using them to solve the human
problems which confront us at a time of world crisis."" But
75. See the liberationist stance of postmodernism infra text accompanying
notes 88-101.
76. THoMAS NAGEL, WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
FOR PHILOSOPHY 101 (1987).
77. O.D. Broad, preface to THE ABDICATION OF PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD I (Eugene Freeman ed., 1976).
The alternative is a re-reading of the story of the Good Samaritan which
alerts us to the kind of scholarship that repudiates practical obligations. The writ-
er is referring to the lawyer's question that had prompted Jesus to tell the story.
Does it describe scholarship and "discourse" in our academic citadels?:
The situation is a familiar one in Jesus' ministry: some clever
questioners are trying to trap him. A lawyer, possessing a Doctor of
Jurisprudence degree from a first-rate law school where he also edited
the Law Review, along with a Ph.D. in Humanities that he picked up
along the way, has a question: what shall he do to inherit eternal life?
Jesus, in good pedagogical fashion, throws the question back to him and
elicits the response that eternal life involves loving God and loving one's
neighbor. Jesus tells him to get on with it, since he now knows what to
do, but the lawyer, unwilling to be disposed of so easily, reenters the
fray. He has another question: "Who is my neighbor?"
By asking the question that way, the lawyer gets the discussion
back onto safe territory. The discussion need not involve being a neighbor
[Vol. XIX:3856
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they cannot do this until they stop using philosophy the way a
drunk uses a street lamp-for support, not for illumination.
B. Postmodernism's Existential Dread
The existential dread of the postmodern mind is engen-
dered by the deeper questions of the human condition facing
postindustrial humanity. This existential crisis-postmodern
melancholia 7 -- is both a cause and a consequence of the
postmodernist turn.
As a cause, it originates in antiquity, in the Greek "Twi-
light of the Gods," where philosophers dragged their gods down
from high Olympus and subjected them to human scrutiny. It
progresses on to the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the
Enlightenment's desecration of religious and royal authority,
culminating in Nietzsche's announcement of the "Death of
God" and skepticism about universal or objective values. 9
The "Death of God" presented the Western psyche with the
mammoth existential problem of cosmic orphanhood, plunging
it into the boredom and ennui that Sartre and Camus descri-
but only defining a neighbor. An academic exploration can ensue, and the
lawyer, his own life-style now exempt from scrutiny, can do brilliantly in
the ensuing verbal exchange. It is the kind of terrain on which lawyers
excel.
Let us explore the lawyer's inner reflections: should the discussion
prove fruitful, perhaps a symposium can be organized around a theme
like "The Concept of Neighborliness" and a really comprehensive defini-
tion arrived at. The lawyer, in fact, sits on the board of a small founda-
tion that might be persuaded to finance such a project. There could be a
series of papers: "The Stoic Concept of Neighborliness," "Neighborliness in
Recent Mid-East Fiction" (a very short paper), "The Cultural Implications
of Neighborliness for Improving Trade Relations with Greece," "Neighbor-
liness: A Woman's Perspective" (written by a man in order to maintain
the desired objectivity), and finally, tapping the local Ph.D. thesis market,
"Neighborliness as Seen by Members of the Slave Class, Being a Series
of Interviews Conducted in the Alexandrian Slave Market for the Purpose
of Attaining Contemporary Data on Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction Ratios."
The papers (the lawyer continues to reflect) could then be published, per-
haps edited by the lawyer himself, and the contributors could add the
volume to their list of publications as a way of assuring that they get
academic tenure-rather than their neighbors.
The fantasy (which I regret to report is far from fanciful) illus-
trates the skill with which we use thought to avoid action. A classic ploy.
ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN, UNEXPECTED NEWS 106-07 (1984) (emphasis added).
78. Minda, supra note 61, at 53 (citing Patrick Ewick, Postmodern Melancho-
lia, 16 LAv & SoC'Y REv. 755 (1922)).
79. See ROBERT B. PIPPIN, MODERNISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 2 (1991).
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bed so poignantly.in the 1950s."° But the crisis was there as
far back as the 1890s. In one of his Adventures of Sherlock
Holmes, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, having depicted a perfectly
technocratic Sherlock Holmes divested of all human senti-
ment,8' now allows his hero to describe what had spurred him
to solve a dangerous puzzle: "'It saved me from ennui,' he an-
swered, yawning. 'Alas! I already feel it closing in upon me. My
life is spent in one long effort to escape from the commonplaces
of existence. These little problems help me to do so.'" 2
As a consequence of postmodernism, this existential crisis
now seems to take the form of the "death" or decentering of
"man" from "author" to "authored" to mere "trace." Herbert
Schnadelbach describes the phenomenon as follows:
The rumour has been spreading and can now be heard on all
sides: man's hour has come. In announcing the death of God,
Nietzsche supposedly became the first to insinuate the death
of man; his echo resounds in the chorus of voices renouncing
humanism and urgently recommending that man finally bid
himself farewell. "Farewell to man" means the end of the
notion that man is the center of the world, the author of his
history and the foundation of all knowledge, including the
knowledge of himself,"
80. Sartre and Camus, both previously active in the French Resistance, were
overwhelmed by the anti-climax of the post-war "mundaneness"; they were por-
trayed in Simon de Beauvoir's novel The Mandarins, "soaked in an atmosphere of
boredom: the characters sit around in nightclubs, drink and smoke too much, and
indulge in a kind of aimless promiscuity." WILSON, supra note 57, at 18.
81. In Adventure 1-A Scandal in Bohemia published in The Strand between
July 1891 and December 1892, Sherlock Holmes is described in the following
terms:
It was not that [Sherlock Holmes] felt any emotion akin to love for Irene
Adler. All emotions, and that one particularly, were abhorrent to his cold,
precise, but admirably balanced mind. He was, I take it, the most perfect
reasoning and observing machine that the world has seen; but, as a
lover, he would have placed himself in a false position. He never spoke
of the softer passions, save with a gibe and a sneer. They were admi-
rable things for the observer-excellent for drawing the veil from men's
motives and actions. But for the trained reasoner to admit such intru-
sions into his own delicate and finely adjusted temperament was to intro-
duce a distracting factor which might throw a doubt upon all his mental
results. Grit in a sensitive instrument, or a crack in one of his
highpower lenses, would not be more disturbing than a strong emotion in
a nature such as his.
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE CLASSIC ILLUSTRATED SHERLOCK HOLIMES 11
(1987).
82. Id at 40.
83. Herbert Schnadelbach, The Face in the San& Foucault and the Anthropo-
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The final stage in this progression is what the late Australian
historian, Manning Clark, aptly christened "the Kingdom of
Nothingness."' In this kingdom, epitomized by the disinte-
gration of art, law, meaning, and other meta-narratives,
purged of Derrida's "metaphysics of presence," texts have no
semiotic reference to reality beyond themselves. All the con-
structs that have given humanity comfort and hope in a lonely
cosmos are portrayed as unravelling ideologies of a pretentious
and discredited elite. There are, of course, dissenting voices, 5
but this is the contemporary phase of the philosophical tradi-
tion founded by Descartes: "a philosophy of despair masquerad-
ing as hyper-radicalism. ' 6 It is as if the nuclear annihilation
which the cold war nearly unleashed now attempts to return in
the guise of philosophical nihilism. But this despair is itself
rooted in the very modernism it rejects.8 7
C. Postmodernism's Liberationist Claim
Despite its epistemic skepticism and its existential de-
spair, postmodernist theories do claim to have a liberationist
agenda. In one form or another, they have, indeed, been adopt-
ed by those discriminated against in their *struggles for equali-
ty and respect. But how can repudiation of the normative be
liberating?
In part, the answer to this apparent paradox lies in
postmodernism's challenge to established orthodoxies and
canons, as well as its celebration of heterogeneity and inclu-
siveness. This is not an insignificant contribution. Sectarian-
ism is one of the greatest threats to the very possibility of a
new world order. Who would have thought that President
Bush, having self-assuredly declared the dawn of a new world
order only a few months earlier, would greet the news of Rajiv
logical Slumber in PHILOSOPHICAL INTERVENTIONS, supra note 55, at 311.
84. MANNING CLARK, A HISTORIAN'S APPRENTICESHIP (1992).
85. See, e.g., RUDOLF ARNHEIM, To THE RESCUE OF ART (1992); STEINER, supra
note 71; FREADMAN & MILLER, supra note 70; Lehman, supra note 74.
86. Joel Whitebook, Freudian Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993 (Book Review),
at 31.
87. See generally Tibor Scitovsky, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (rev. ed., 1992). For
some solutions to this condition, see generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE (1990).
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Gandhi's assassination by Sikh militants with an incredulous
"I just don't know what the world is coming to"?8" Henry Lou-
is Gates, Jr. documents the cultural version of this fragmenta-
tion, in the United States, eight months before the 1992 Los
Angeles riots: 9
Increasing incidents of violence are associated with ethnic
differences in very many places in the world: Hasidim and
African-Americans in Crown Heights, Brooklyn; Serbs and
Croats in Yugoslavia; Koreans and African-Americans in
Flatbush, Brooklyn; Zulus and Xhosas in South Africa; Poles
and Gypsies in Poland; the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda; the
Yoruba and Igbos in Nigeria; and, of course, the fate of the
Jews in Ethiopia and in the Soviet Union. The list seems to
grow longer, rather than shorter as we stumble our way as a
society into the twenty-first century. In 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois
could write, prophetically, that the problem of the twentieth
century would be the color line. We might well argue that the
problem of the twenty-first century will be the problem of
ethnic differences, as these conspire with complex differences
in color, gender, and class.90
The Postmodernist challenge to canons and edifices might
flush out those whom Gates calls "[v]ulgar cultural national-
ists" and "polemicists" who "thrive on absolute partitions" but
who are ultimately "whistling in the wind."9' It also attempts
to bring in from the wilderness long excluded particularities of
gender and race.92
But its modus operandi is equivalent to cracking a nut
with a sledgehammer. It gives minorities and those "othered"
by society a weapon which attacks the pretentiousness of domi-
88. Thomas L. Friedman, Nations at War With Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 1991, at E3.
89. As Michael Mandelbaum, director of East-West Studies at the Council of
Foreign Relations, remarked in 1991, "The gulf war is the wave of the past. India,
Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and the breakup of the Soviet Union are the wave of the
future." Id.
90. HENRY GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS xl
(1992). He might have added to the list: Tanils and Singhelese in Sri Lanka;
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; but also people of no discernible
ethnic or religious differences as in Somalia.
91. Id. at xvi (giving as an instance ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND (1987)).
92. See generally EDVARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993) (and ex-
planations for masked actions).
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nant canons, even as it destroys the very moral foundations of
the attacker's own case. It attempts to expose hidden self-inter-
est in ostensibly universal norms, but leaves the whole edifice
shattered into a thousand fragments-each ensconced in its
own belligerent subjectivism. 93 We would do well to heed
Gates's injunction that "the mindless celebration of difference
for its own sake is no more tenable than the nostalgic return to
some monochrome homogeneity."94 By espousing "difference
for its own sake"95 and by repudiating ethical discourse alto-
gether on the assumption "that its obsolescence or even perni-
ciousness are established facts,"96 postmodernism has implic-
itly repudiated and subverted its own claim to be liberating.
It has been suggested that repudiation of ethical value
might lead to playing fast and loose with substantive moral
imperatives. 98 It is more to the point that the towering per-
sonalties who courageously stood against evil this century
were, without exception, driven by their unwavering fidelity to
the moral canons of human dignity, human rights, meaning,
justice, faith, hope. From Elie Weisel and Victor Frankl to
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov; from Mahatma
Gandhi to Mother Teresa and Archbishops Oscar Romero,
Desmond Tutu, and Janaan Luwuum; from Martin Luther
King, Jr. to Nelson Mandela-the claims of those who light
candles instead of exalting the darkness have always been
logocentric.
In his famous Lincoln Memorial speech, Martin Luther
King, Jr. could have proclaimed, in true deconstructionist
style, that the text of the United States Constitution's "un-
alienable rights" had collapsed into the subtext of slavery and
93. The normative here also points to principles that govern rationality which
have both personal and interpersonal function. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF
RATIONALITY (1933).
94. GATES, supra note 90, at xix.
95. GATES, supra note 90, at xix.
96. FREADNAN & MILLER, supra note 70, at 51.
97. Minority and feminist scholars have increasingly taken Critical Legal Stud-
ies to task over its attack on rights which historically have been the idiom of
their claim to human dignity and equality. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 61, at 40
n.82 (citing Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986)).
98. In his Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man,
David Lehman makes the connection between de Man's ethical agnosticism and his
wartime anti-semitic journalism. LEHMAN, supra note 74.
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legalized racism, and self-deconstructed out of existence. In-
stead he saw in the words of the Constitution a promissory
note to be honored as he put it in one of the greatest moral
statements of this century:
In a sense we have come to our nation's capital to cash a
check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnifi-
cent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all
men would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liber-
ty, and the pursuit of happiness.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this
promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned.
Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given
the Negro people a bad check; a check which has come back
marked "insufficient funds." But we refuse to believe that the
bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are
insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this na-
tion. So we have come to cash this check-a check that will
give us upon demanci the riches of freedom and the security of
justice.9
But the greatest embarrassment to deconstruction's celebration
of nihilism comes from those for whom nihilism was not an
intellectual position, but reality."0 From the unrepresentable
world of the Holocaust, Victor Frankl protests against "the
contemporary nihilism transmitted on many an academic cam-
99. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., Enables the Civil Rights Movement at the
Lincoln Memorial, reprinted in LEND ME YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY
495, 497 (William Safire ed., 1992).
100. For instance in his recent Race Matters Cornell West has powerfully
chronicled the nihilistic threat to African-Americans which liberal structuralists
misunderstand and conservative behaviorists contribute to:
Nihilism is not new in black America. The first African encounter
with the New World was an encounter with a distinctive form of the
Absurd. The initial black struggle against degradation and devaluation in
the enslaved circumstances of the New World was, in part, a struggle
against nihilism. In fact, the major enemy of black survival in America
has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilis-
tic threat-that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as
hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming
oppression stays alive. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat
is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there
can be no struggle.
CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrERS 15 (1993) (emphasis added).
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pus" which gleefully contends "that everything is meaningless,"
that there is no justice, that everything is random and the
world a cruel joke.' ° ' The Holocaust is one occasion where
disowning meaning and repudiating faith would have been
unanswerable.' 2
The voices of those who had reason to succumb to nihilism
but did not still break through the eerie silence of the
postmodernist wasteland and its philosophy of despair. The
Grotian challenge to rebuild against odds is an affirmation of
hope. Entropy needs no assistance; it is the default mode of the
universe.
IV. RE-INVENTING THE CANNON OF HOMOCENTRIC STATEHOOD
What shape then should the normative dimension of the
new world take? In a recent article, the Secretary General of
101. VICTOR FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 176-77 (rev. ed. 1984).
102. Robert McAfee Brown describes a visit to Holocaust camps:
The roof of the crematorium at Birkenau, the death-camp of Auschwitz.
We are standing on ruins the Germans tried (unsuccessfully) to obliter-
ate, to hide evidence that six million Jews had been shot and gassed and
burned in such places, solely because they were Jews. I reflect: if Golgo-
tha revealed the sense of God-forsakenness of one Jew, Birkenau multi-
plies that anguish at least three and a half million times. For the rest of
my life, this crematorium will represent the most powerful case against
God, the spot where one could-with justice--denounce, deny, or (worst of
all) ignore God, the God who was silent.
Of what use are words at such a time? So many cried out to God
at this spot and were not heard. Human silence today seems the only
appropriate response to divine silence yesterday. We remain silent. Our
silence is deafening. And then it comes-first from the lips of one man,
Elie Weisel (standing in the camp where thirty-five years earlier his life
and family and faith were destroyed), and then in a mounting chorus
from others, mostly Jews, the great affirmation: Shema Yisroel, Adonai
Elohenu, Adonai echod, Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is
One.
At the place where the name of God could be agonizingly denied,
the name of God is agonizingly affirmed-by those with most reason to
deny. I shake in the tension between my impulse to deny and their deci-
sion to affirm.
Because of having stood at Birkenau with them, it is now possible
for me to affirm God in ways I never did before.
ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN, CREATIVE DISLOCATION-THE MOVEMENT' OF GRACE 29
(Robert A. Raines ed., 1980); cf. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN Ex-
PLAINED TO CHILDREN: CORRESPONDENCE 1982-1985 30-31 (Julian Refanis & Mor-
gan Thomas trans., 1992) (originally published in French as Le Posmoderne
Explique aux Enfants, a most deceptive title if ever there was one, this piece gives
the postmodernist view of the Holocaust).
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the UN insisted that the most positive feature of the post-cold
war period was multi-lateralism which needs to be defended
against ultra-nationalism on the one hand, and micro-national-
ism on the other. °3 Ultra-nationalism is another name for
the unilateralism of the cold war era: "[Niostalgic for the years
when one or a few big powers called all the shots," Boutros-
Ghali wrote, "[ultra-nationalists] would prefer that the UN
serve as cover for [their] interests and return to the relatively
marginal role it played in years past."' 4 Micro-nationalism is
the upsurge of "ethnic or tribal forces that cause states to frac-
ture and fall apart."' 5 Multi-lateralism, the Secretary Gener-
al noted, was the voluntary cooperation of nations for peace
and development, rooted in the popular democratic will of the
world's people: "The people of the world have become convinced
that democracy is essential to progress with justice. Multi-
lateralism is the democracy of international society."
10 6
Now multi-lateralism is clearly preferable to both ultra-
nationalism and micro-nationalism. One hardly hears any
dissenting voices to recent UN activities in Somalia, Haiti, and
elsewhere; the calls are, indeed, for greater (not less) involve-
ment in more places. There is, however, a problematic leap in
the Secretary General's reasoning from human interests to
state interests. The equation of human democracy with multi-
lateral state action, and of a concert of states with the interna-
tional society, glosses over the normative dimension of the
emerging world order and the persistent question of whether
and how human interests will be protected in that order.
A. The Grotian Project at Century's End
In formulating an answer to the question of human inter-
ests, one needs to guard against two pitfalls. The first is facile
utopianism, the kind that has brought untold suffering to mil-
lions of people in the twentieth century alone. Human beings
should not again be recklessly sacrificed "on the altars of ab-
stractions-nation, church, party, class, progress, the forces of
history"' or any other. So many eggs have been broken this
103. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Don't Make the U.N.'s Hard Job Harder, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A29.
104. Id.
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106. Id.
107. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE
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century and "the habit of breaking them [grew] but the om-
elette remain[ed] invisible."08 The second pitfall is that of
simply reacting to events as they occur the way a subsistence
farmer responds to his or her needs of sustenance. The subsis-
tence approach may have served humanity well in simpler
times but it will not do today, let alone in the twenty-first
century.
Between these extremes lies a cautious approach. The first
task is to construct a universal order from what is available.
This is a temporal process-a process that requires sociological
studies into diverse communities, cultures, and value systems
that make up the world population with a view to identifying
common themes-that is, continuing the work of Jenks,
McDougal, and Falk in ,earnest. The second task is to
reconceptualize statehood in line with the new imperatives.
B. Limited Sovereignty and Qualitative Statehood
The Westphalian concept of statehood, as we have already
seen, was built on intra- and inter-state sovereignty. In some
western nations, intra-state sovereignty grudgingly gave way
to popular sovereignty but in the majority of states this has
not happened yet, although the prospects look better now than
at any other time.
There are two possible conceptions of statehood: the organ-
ic conception, and the collective one. The organic conception at-
tributes to the state a personality independent of, and indeed
superior to, the human beings living in its borders. This was
particularly the doctrine of those states which continued to
cling to both internal and external sovereignty-principally
Nazi Germany, the Soviet bloc, and to a certain degree, the
newly independent nations immediately after their colonial
experience. The doctrine held not only that "[tihe existence of
sovereign states ... is not dependent upon the will or desire of
individual persons"' 9 but also that "The extent and charac-
ter of human rights within a specific state (they do not exist
outside a state) are defined in the final analysis by the nature
HIsTORY OF IDEAS 16 (1991).
108. Id.
109. G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (William E. Butler
trans., 1974).
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of the state, and this nature is itself a product of the economic
system of a given society." ° Consequently, the principle that
human rights fell within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of
states was regarded as a "proposition of cardinal impor-
tance.""' There is, therefore, no remedy for human rights
violations committed by the state: The state giveth; the state
taketh away."
The alternative view is to regard the state as a collective,
having no independent juristic personality apart from the real
human beings who make up its population. This would create
a legal system approximating that of Josephus Jitta who, writ-
ing in 1919, insisted, surely against the facts, that "Mankind
[was] undoubtedly a community de facto, producing positive
and negative duties of each member of the community, towards
his fellow-members and towards the community as a social
body.""' Roscoe Pound echoes this view in the relationship
he postulates between individuals and social interests: "The
life of individuals in society is one thing not two. Any claim
made by a member of society has the aspects both of his own
continuance as an individual and of the continuance of the
society in which he is an individual .... ,,1
I suggest that, contrary to the collective model, the nation-
state is not about to wither away; nor would it be a good thing
if it did. But neither should it retain its pretentious claim to
intrinsic sovereignty not derived from its human population. I
propose rather, an "instrumental personality" for states-a
juristic personality which, like that of a corporation, exists
because it is needed for the performance of particular func-
tions. As with a corporation, circumstances may require the
veil of a state's juristic personality to be lifted so as to reveal
the actual human circumstances behind it. This would be a
belated recognition of the fact that the very sine qua non of na-
tion-states, as of the world order, is the protection of human
dignity and human rights. Entrenching a normative foundation
such as this would give validity to the commendable multi-
lateralism which we have seen since 1989. In the twenty-first
110. Id. at 82.
111. Id. at 83.
112. See H. KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW 179 (1955).
113. JOSEPHUS JITA, THE RENOVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1919).
114. JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 199 (1966).
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century, qualitative, homocentric statehood ought to replace
formal statehood. The precise formulation of this principle and
the framework for its realization is the urgent new Grotian
project now freed from Clausewitzian and Cartesian fetters; it
is the imperative of a normative dimension of the new world
order. Thomas Franck's recent article, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance is a salutary step in this direction."
5
V. CONCLUSION
A world order is a stool on three legs: the political, the
normative, and the institutional. Built on only two--the politi-
cal and institutional, for instance-it may endure for a while,
but will not stay upright very long. An enduring world order is
one in which the institutional (legal) dimension mediates be-
tween the political and normative ones; an order in which
institutional integrity welds and melds together the reality of
power and the vision of justice. For as Manuel Komroff warns
in his foreword to Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov: "Be-
tween revolutionary ruthlessness and conservative stupidity
man is caught and crushed.""6
In this Article I discussed two paradigms inhospitable to
the Grotian task of building a normative foundation for the
new world order: Clausewitzian realism which has somewhat
retreated with the end of the cold war, and postmodernist
skepticism with its deafening obituaries to the "death of man."
This Article not only supports the Grotian project; it also in-
sists that, contrary to postmodernist orthodoxy, that project
must be homocentric-grounded in the intrinsic dignity of the
human person-the unrealized promise of 1945. Human digni-
ty was self-evident to the Psalmist: "For thou hast made [man]
a little lower than the angels,"" 7 and to Shakespeare: "What
115. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
116. Manuel Komroff, Foreword to FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAMIAZOV at xiii (Constance Garnett trans., Signet Classics 1986).
117. Psalms 8:3-5:
When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the
stars, which thou hast ordained; What is man that thou are mindful of
him? and the son of man that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him
a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and
honour.
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a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in
faculties!""' But humanity, it is now often assumed, has
been "decentered" by Copernican cosmology and post-Cartesian
skepticism. I have attempted to show that the latter has all
but deconstructed itself out of existence. But what of the exis-
tential dread, the "Death of God" and its attendant cosmic or-
phanhood in which women and men, far from being made in
the image of God, are insignificant specs in a vast, indifferent
cosmos? The Copernican revolution seemed to supply this sure
cosmological foundation to postmodernism.
The answer is that these obituaries are "grossly exaggerat-
ed." The nature of humanity is as intellectually fascinating a
study today as ever. 19  Indeed, it is quite possible that the
postmodernist decentering of "man" and its repudiation of the
normative, derived from this Copernican mold, are already
history. Modern cosmologists and mathematicians with their
"theories of everything," these days sound more and more theo-
logical as they contemplate the marvel of humanity the way
the Psalmist and Shakespeare did, and as they ponder the
notions of aesthetic and moral value in art, poetry, music,
spirituality, and the moral sense, 20 and ask: are they simply
illusions as logical positivists used to claim, or are they "real
presence[s] "a-rumors of a deeper and more exalted reality?
These are difficult puzzles. But for the intrinsic worth of the
human personality that creates them we might as well allow a
leading mathematician, physicist, and cosmologist to speak the
last word into the postmodernist wilderness:
We who are children of the universe-animated star
dust-can nevertheless reflect on the nature of that same
universe, even to the extent of glimpsing the rules on which
it runs. How we have become linked into this cosmic dimen-
sion is a mystery .... the physical species Homo may count
118. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2. ("What a piece of work is
man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how ex-
press and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a
God!").
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for nothing, but the existence of mind in some organism on
some planet in the universe is surely a fact of fundamental
significance. Through conscious beings the universe has gen-
erated self-awareness. This can be no trivial detail, no minor
byproduct of mindless, purposeless forces. We are truly
meant to be here.122
There is no firmer normative foundation for the world order of
the Third Millennium.
122. PAUL DAVIES, THE MIND OF GOD: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR A RATIONAL
WORLD 232 (1992).
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